the reaction when the bomb is detonated. The bottom hemisphere would be filled with iron ballast. The weight of bomb core, casing and ballast material acting as an anvil would have been limited to one tonne, the payload of a V-2, the speed of the rocket at impact rendering superfluous the four or so tonnes of HE necessary to set off the device in normal circumstances. Impact was at Mach 3.5. Because detonation would not be uniform around the bomb sphere, this method would have resulted in a âfizzleâ equivalent to several dozen tonnes of TNT, an earthquake effect and meltdown with radioactive fallout.
It was a brilliant concept, cheap to manufacture anywhere and not difficult to produce in numbers. The failure of the Leipzig experiment after only three weeks signalled the end of Professor Heisenbergâs participation in the project and in midsummer 1942 the project was transferred elsewhere.
CHAPTER 6
The German Post
Office Takes Over
âI, of all people, did in fact lead the way for the great advance in atomic development in the German Reich.â
Wilhelm Ohnesorge, Postmaster General, 1937-1945 Quoted from his obituary, Soldatenzeitung, East Berlin, 10 March 1962.
A LBERT SPEER 69 recalled that, although Hitler did speak to him occasionally of the possibilities of the atom bomb, the strategic benefits of having it eluded the Führer. The subject was a source of irritation to Speer, for he knew that there was in existence some sort of secret arrangement involving the Post Office about which he was being left completely in the dark, and this appeared to be a matter on which, as Armaments Minister, he really ought to have been consulted.
Explaining that there were 2200 recorded points of reference in his conferences with Hitler, and that there was only a single occasion when the subject of nuclear research appeared on the agenda, being passed over âwith laconic brevityâ, Speer noted Hitlerâs strengthening resolve not to pursue the matter.
Hitlerâs objection to the atom bomb was fundamental. He had read somewhere (almost certainly the article by Professor Jean Thibaud of the Sorbonne published on 12 March 1941) that a nuclear explosion might proceed to ignite all the hydrogen atoms in the atmosphere, transforming the world into a glowing star. German physicists could not guarantee that the theory was definitely wrong: even at Los Alamos in July 1945 the Italian-American physicist Fermi wondered aloud whether the test bomb he was about to ignite might trigger the heavens, destroying every living thing on earth. Speer thus concluded:
âEven if Hitler had not been against nuclear research on doctrinal grounds [i.e. Aryan Physics]: even if the stage we had reached in investigating the principles in June 1942 had provided the atomic physicists with an objective for the investment of thousands of millions of marks towards producing the atom bomb, it would have been impossible for our strained war economy to have brought together the technicians, materials and priorities for the project.â 70
It is an odd thing that Hitler should have appeared to shun atomic physics when speaking to Speer whilst openly affirming his enthusiasm for its future prospects to his closer companions at table. Martin Bormannâs stenographer Henry Picker recorded 71 that Hitler considered the splitting of the atom to be the most important of all scientific achievements for Germanyâs future to the extent that it was the Führer himself who was inspirational in having the short documentary film Gold starring Hans Albers exhibited repeatedly in cinemas in order to popularize the subject of nuclear science. Anything short of a chain reaction was Aryan Physics.
Albert Speer wrote disapprovingly 72 about the unaccountable optimism in Hitlerâs demeanour whenever the subject of nuclear energy came under discussion in the early summer of 1942, and the Führerâs disposition appeared to Speer
It was a brilliant concept, cheap to manufacture anywhere and not difficult to produce in numbers. The failure of the Leipzig experiment after only three weeks signalled the end of Professor Heisenbergâs participation in the project and in midsummer 1942 the project was transferred elsewhere.
CHAPTER 6
The German Post
Office Takes Over
âI, of all people, did in fact lead the way for the great advance in atomic development in the German Reich.â
Wilhelm Ohnesorge, Postmaster General, 1937-1945 Quoted from his obituary, Soldatenzeitung, East Berlin, 10 March 1962.
A LBERT SPEER 69 recalled that, although Hitler did speak to him occasionally of the possibilities of the atom bomb, the strategic benefits of having it eluded the Führer. The subject was a source of irritation to Speer, for he knew that there was in existence some sort of secret arrangement involving the Post Office about which he was being left completely in the dark, and this appeared to be a matter on which, as Armaments Minister, he really ought to have been consulted.
Explaining that there were 2200 recorded points of reference in his conferences with Hitler, and that there was only a single occasion when the subject of nuclear research appeared on the agenda, being passed over âwith laconic brevityâ, Speer noted Hitlerâs strengthening resolve not to pursue the matter.
Hitlerâs objection to the atom bomb was fundamental. He had read somewhere (almost certainly the article by Professor Jean Thibaud of the Sorbonne published on 12 March 1941) that a nuclear explosion might proceed to ignite all the hydrogen atoms in the atmosphere, transforming the world into a glowing star. German physicists could not guarantee that the theory was definitely wrong: even at Los Alamos in July 1945 the Italian-American physicist Fermi wondered aloud whether the test bomb he was about to ignite might trigger the heavens, destroying every living thing on earth. Speer thus concluded:
âEven if Hitler had not been against nuclear research on doctrinal grounds [i.e. Aryan Physics]: even if the stage we had reached in investigating the principles in June 1942 had provided the atomic physicists with an objective for the investment of thousands of millions of marks towards producing the atom bomb, it would have been impossible for our strained war economy to have brought together the technicians, materials and priorities for the project.â 70
It is an odd thing that Hitler should have appeared to shun atomic physics when speaking to Speer whilst openly affirming his enthusiasm for its future prospects to his closer companions at table. Martin Bormannâs stenographer Henry Picker recorded 71 that Hitler considered the splitting of the atom to be the most important of all scientific achievements for Germanyâs future to the extent that it was the Führer himself who was inspirational in having the short documentary film Gold starring Hans Albers exhibited repeatedly in cinemas in order to popularize the subject of nuclear science. Anything short of a chain reaction was Aryan Physics.
Albert Speer wrote disapprovingly 72 about the unaccountable optimism in Hitlerâs demeanour whenever the subject of nuclear energy came under discussion in the early summer of 1942, and the Führerâs disposition appeared to Speer
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