his subsequent victories, Adolf Hitler promoted him to field marshal on June 30, 1942.
The Siege of Leningrad was a problem that plagued Kuechler throughout his tenure of command at Army Group North and eventually ended his career. A planned German offensive in the fall of 1942 had to be cancelled because of the Stalingrad crisis, and after that about all Kuechler could do was to try to maintain his siege lines. He repelled several massive attacks in October, but on January 12, 1943, a dozen Red Army divisions struck at Schluesselburg and by the 19th had established a six-mile-wide corridor to the city, linking Leningrad to the outside world for the first time in 17 months.
Throughout 1943 Army Group North was neglected by Hitler and the High Command of the Army. From December 22, 1942, Kuechler lost eight divisions to other theaters, including both of his panzer divisions and two of his three motorized divisions. By October 10, 1943, he had 43 divisions: 30 infantry (almost all understrength), three jaeger (light divisions with only two infantry regiments), and three security divisions (with only two infantry regiments and no organic artillery). He had only one motorized infantry division. His other five divisions (four Luftwaffe Field divisions and a training division) were of little combat value. Nevertheless, in November 1943, Hitler forced him to commit five infantry divisions to the Battle of Nevel, on the extreme southern end of his line. Kuechler protested against this depletion of his reserve because he feared an imminent Soviet attack in the Leningrad sector but was curtly overruled.
Kuechler was right. In late December 1943, he was forced to give up three more divisions. 18 He now had only 40 understrength divisions to defend some 500 miles of front at a time when a full-strength division could expect to successfully defend only about six miles against a determined attack. In late December, Kuechler urgently requested permission to abandon the Siege of Leningrad and retreat to the Panther Line in the west, a move that would shorten his defensive line by 120 miles. Hitler not only denied him permission but, as if to add injury to insult, also transferred three more infantry divisions (the veteran 1st, 96th, and 254th) to other sectors. All three were taken from 18th Army, which was facing Leningrad. Again Kuechler protested; again he was ignored.
The Soviet offensive struck 18th Army in full fury on January 14, 1944. On January 17 Georg Lindemann, the commander of 18th Army, requested permission to retreat, but Hitler refused to allow it. The situation continued to deteriorate until the following evening, when Kuechler signaled OKH that he intended to retreat that night, whether Hitler approved or not. Hitler did approve that night, but only after General Kurt Zeitzler informed him that the retreat was already in progress. The Fuehrer, however, would agree only to local withdrawals. No general withdrawal to the Panther Line was permitted. Finally, however, on the orders of Army Group North, 18th Army did begin a general retreat on January 30. It had suffered 31,000 casualties (including 14,000 killed) and was down to a strength of 17,000 men.
Hitler approved the order of January 30 but the next day summoned Kuechler to Fuehrer Headquarters and relieved him of his command. He was made the scapegoat for the entire disaster and was never reemployed.
* * *
Field Marshal von Kuechler was not a great general and has been accused of moving too slowly in conquering the Baltic States in 1941. These charges seem unjust, considering that all of his divisions were non-motorized infantry. Although Kuechler is almost unknown in the West, he in many ways typifies the anonymous German general in the East. He was a tough, respected, highly competent commander who was neglected and ignored by Berlin until a disaster occurred. Then he was relieved, made the scapegoat, and sent into permanent retirement. Hitler would have done
The Siege of Leningrad was a problem that plagued Kuechler throughout his tenure of command at Army Group North and eventually ended his career. A planned German offensive in the fall of 1942 had to be cancelled because of the Stalingrad crisis, and after that about all Kuechler could do was to try to maintain his siege lines. He repelled several massive attacks in October, but on January 12, 1943, a dozen Red Army divisions struck at Schluesselburg and by the 19th had established a six-mile-wide corridor to the city, linking Leningrad to the outside world for the first time in 17 months.
Throughout 1943 Army Group North was neglected by Hitler and the High Command of the Army. From December 22, 1942, Kuechler lost eight divisions to other theaters, including both of his panzer divisions and two of his three motorized divisions. By October 10, 1943, he had 43 divisions: 30 infantry (almost all understrength), three jaeger (light divisions with only two infantry regiments), and three security divisions (with only two infantry regiments and no organic artillery). He had only one motorized infantry division. His other five divisions (four Luftwaffe Field divisions and a training division) were of little combat value. Nevertheless, in November 1943, Hitler forced him to commit five infantry divisions to the Battle of Nevel, on the extreme southern end of his line. Kuechler protested against this depletion of his reserve because he feared an imminent Soviet attack in the Leningrad sector but was curtly overruled.
Kuechler was right. In late December 1943, he was forced to give up three more divisions. 18 He now had only 40 understrength divisions to defend some 500 miles of front at a time when a full-strength division could expect to successfully defend only about six miles against a determined attack. In late December, Kuechler urgently requested permission to abandon the Siege of Leningrad and retreat to the Panther Line in the west, a move that would shorten his defensive line by 120 miles. Hitler not only denied him permission but, as if to add injury to insult, also transferred three more infantry divisions (the veteran 1st, 96th, and 254th) to other sectors. All three were taken from 18th Army, which was facing Leningrad. Again Kuechler protested; again he was ignored.
The Soviet offensive struck 18th Army in full fury on January 14, 1944. On January 17 Georg Lindemann, the commander of 18th Army, requested permission to retreat, but Hitler refused to allow it. The situation continued to deteriorate until the following evening, when Kuechler signaled OKH that he intended to retreat that night, whether Hitler approved or not. Hitler did approve that night, but only after General Kurt Zeitzler informed him that the retreat was already in progress. The Fuehrer, however, would agree only to local withdrawals. No general withdrawal to the Panther Line was permitted. Finally, however, on the orders of Army Group North, 18th Army did begin a general retreat on January 30. It had suffered 31,000 casualties (including 14,000 killed) and was down to a strength of 17,000 men.
Hitler approved the order of January 30 but the next day summoned Kuechler to Fuehrer Headquarters and relieved him of his command. He was made the scapegoat for the entire disaster and was never reemployed.
* * *
Field Marshal von Kuechler was not a great general and has been accused of moving too slowly in conquering the Baltic States in 1941. These charges seem unjust, considering that all of his divisions were non-motorized infantry. Although Kuechler is almost unknown in the West, he in many ways typifies the anonymous German general in the East. He was a tough, respected, highly competent commander who was neglected and ignored by Berlin until a disaster occurred. Then he was relieved, made the scapegoat, and sent into permanent retirement. Hitler would have done
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