of the retro rockets. If the signal was valid, any assistance in keeping the heat shield in place (such as retaining the spent retro package after firing the rockets and reentering with the spent retro package in place) would serve to help keep the heat shield in place but the burning of the retro package could damage (or even destroy) the heat shield and/or change the vehicle aerodynamics to an unsafe condition. There were very competent advisors with strong opinions on both sides of the issue.
It was ultimately decided to retain the retro package for re-entry and John Glenn was so informed. He accepted the decision and it worked fine. The arrival of MA-6, coming through blackout, the parachute sequence and landing, was a special moment for this young space team. We had put our American in orbit and he was back home safely. But, again, we were forcefully reminded how quickly conditions could develop which can be a most serious threat to the survival of the astronaut and how we can be confronted with choices that have never been considered or studied.
The lessons learned from this experience still flow through the processes today. Much greater attention was (and is) paid to including redundant and/or complementary methods to absolutely confirm any indication of a threat by multiple paths. Gemini and Apollo quickly benefitted. In order to have a final authority, the mission rules now include an unequivocal statement defining the Flight Director as that final authority for any decision involving the safety of the crew and/or the success of the mission. Certain protocols were established to provide the program and engineering personnel with a communication path for answering questions or making inputs. This protocol evolved over the early programs to become a very well controlled, documented and powerful adjunct to the conduct of manned space operations, right up until today.
The significance to our country of this first big achievement in what had become known as the “space race” was manifested best by the outpouring of celebration and recognition of John Glenn across the country. One space flight and John went from a relative unknown to a national and international celebrity. And he carried it off with grace and dignity.
Completely absorbed at the time, we did not enjoy a lot of reflection time. But that period of fifteen months was a measure of what this country, and NASA in particular, can do. Six Redstone flights, five Atlas flights with three of them to earth orbit, two new programs: Gemini to prepare for the future and Apollo to be the future, and a prospective move to Houston. It was a time to really enjoy the enthusiastic support of our fellow citizens.
During this fifteen-month campaign, the Soviet Union flew two manned flights. Yuri Gagarin in Vostok-1 flew for one orbit on April 12, 1961. Gherman Titov launched in Vostok-2 on August 6, 1961, and flew for one day. The Soviets probably had other un-crewed test flights during this time, but not announced as elements of the manned program. We had not won, we were still behind, but we certainly felt a lot better about our prospects.
John Glenn Ingresses Friendship 7
Chapter Seven: Completing Mercury and Hello Houston
MA-7
John Llewellyn got the prime retro assignment for MA-7 and Carl Huss, our across the street Friendswood neighbor, took on the mentoring role for John and later for Jerry Bostick. By this time, Carl’s duties as John Mayer’s deputy in the Mission Planning Branch were growing with the upbeat of Gemini and Apollo. It was interesting to watch this interaction between John and Carl. Carl was almost over-the-top rigorous; they could not have been more different in approach, but they made it through.
John and I worked the MA-7 flight of Scott Carpenter together in the MCC at the Cape. From the beginning of the flight, there were problems with the spacecraft attitude reference. They were never really worked because Carpenter did not
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