holds that aspects of the game opposed to hitting have outstripped the power of batters to compensate and respond in kind—in other words, that batters have not been able to keep up with increased sophistication in other aspects of play. This "tougher competition" theory also features three arguments (each with several subcategories)— rather obvious in this case, as representing the three institutions of baseball that might challenge good hitting:
Better pitching (invention of such new pitches as the slider and split-fingered fastball; the establishment of relief pitching as a specialty, with a resulting requirement for facing new and fresh arms in late innings, rather than a tired opponent seen several times before in the same game).
Better fielding (conversion of gloves from tiny protective coverings to much larger, ball-gobbling machines; general improvement of defense, particularly in coordination among fielders).
Better managing (replacement of intuitive, "seat of the pants" leadership with modern, computer-assisted assessments of strengths and weaknesses for each individual batter).
In supporting the external theory of "tougher conditions," for example, Tommy Holmes stressed the subtheme of "harder schedules" in his article "We’ll Never Have Another .400 Hitter" in the February 1956 issue of Sport magazine:
They [0.400 hitters of yore] started all of their single games in mid-afternoon, doubleheaders a little earlier. They never played later than sundown and usually were finished hours before dark. They did not play in the hot sunshine of one day and in the heavy damp night air the next. If they did not get the proper rest and eat proper food at regular hours, it was nobody’s fault but their own.
For the other two subthemes, my colleague John J. Chiment of the Boyce Thompson Institute for Plant Research at Cornell University polled the large contingent of baseball fans in his lab, and sent me the following in defense of the nocturnal theory (letter of April 24, 1984): "The consensus at BTI favors ’Night Games’ as the real problem. You just can’t hit’m if you can’t see’m. Which is not to say that ’The rise of the speciality relief pitcher’ and ’Modern moral turpitude’ don’t have their adherents."
Finally, in June 1993, Colorado Rockies manager (and former savvy player) Don Baylor upheld the "intrusive press" theory when his star Andres Galarraga and Toronto’s John Olerud both exceeded 0.400 (before their predictable decline later in the season): "Can you imagine the pressure there’d be nowadays, the press conferences that would be held after every game? If a guy is hitting 0.400 in August?" As Olerud continued to flirt with 0.400 in August, George Brett blamed the same source—and he should know, for his average stood at 0.407 on August 26, 1980, while he finished that season at 0.390. Brett remembered the journalistic assault:
It was the same damn questions over and over and over. Gees, it was monotonous, and boring. In 1961, when he was chasing Babe Ruth [for the record of home runs in a season] Roger Maris lost his hair. In 1980, I got hemorrhoids. I don’t know what will happen to John, but I imagine it will be something.
The internal theory of "tougher competition" also enjoys wide support in all three major versions:
1. BETTER PITCHING. During my lifetime as a fan, pitching has changed more dramatically than any other aspect of the game. In my youth, during the late 1940s, most pitchers relied on curves and fastballs and they expected to work a full nine innings unless seriously shelled and tired. Relief pitching didn’t exist as a specialty; if the starter tired, the manager just put in the next man available. Now, nearly all pitchers have expanded their repertoire, with sliders and split-fingered fastballs as favored additions. And relief pitching has become an essential component of all good teams, with recognized subspecialties of middle relievers (good for several
Better pitching (invention of such new pitches as the slider and split-fingered fastball; the establishment of relief pitching as a specialty, with a resulting requirement for facing new and fresh arms in late innings, rather than a tired opponent seen several times before in the same game).
Better fielding (conversion of gloves from tiny protective coverings to much larger, ball-gobbling machines; general improvement of defense, particularly in coordination among fielders).
Better managing (replacement of intuitive, "seat of the pants" leadership with modern, computer-assisted assessments of strengths and weaknesses for each individual batter).
In supporting the external theory of "tougher conditions," for example, Tommy Holmes stressed the subtheme of "harder schedules" in his article "We’ll Never Have Another .400 Hitter" in the February 1956 issue of Sport magazine:
They [0.400 hitters of yore] started all of their single games in mid-afternoon, doubleheaders a little earlier. They never played later than sundown and usually were finished hours before dark. They did not play in the hot sunshine of one day and in the heavy damp night air the next. If they did not get the proper rest and eat proper food at regular hours, it was nobody’s fault but their own.
For the other two subthemes, my colleague John J. Chiment of the Boyce Thompson Institute for Plant Research at Cornell University polled the large contingent of baseball fans in his lab, and sent me the following in defense of the nocturnal theory (letter of April 24, 1984): "The consensus at BTI favors ’Night Games’ as the real problem. You just can’t hit’m if you can’t see’m. Which is not to say that ’The rise of the speciality relief pitcher’ and ’Modern moral turpitude’ don’t have their adherents."
Finally, in June 1993, Colorado Rockies manager (and former savvy player) Don Baylor upheld the "intrusive press" theory when his star Andres Galarraga and Toronto’s John Olerud both exceeded 0.400 (before their predictable decline later in the season): "Can you imagine the pressure there’d be nowadays, the press conferences that would be held after every game? If a guy is hitting 0.400 in August?" As Olerud continued to flirt with 0.400 in August, George Brett blamed the same source—and he should know, for his average stood at 0.407 on August 26, 1980, while he finished that season at 0.390. Brett remembered the journalistic assault:
It was the same damn questions over and over and over. Gees, it was monotonous, and boring. In 1961, when he was chasing Babe Ruth [for the record of home runs in a season] Roger Maris lost his hair. In 1980, I got hemorrhoids. I don’t know what will happen to John, but I imagine it will be something.
The internal theory of "tougher competition" also enjoys wide support in all three major versions:
1. BETTER PITCHING. During my lifetime as a fan, pitching has changed more dramatically than any other aspect of the game. In my youth, during the late 1940s, most pitchers relied on curves and fastballs and they expected to work a full nine innings unless seriously shelled and tired. Relief pitching didn’t exist as a specialty; if the starter tired, the manager just put in the next man available. Now, nearly all pitchers have expanded their repertoire, with sliders and split-fingered fastballs as favored additions. And relief pitching has become an essential component of all good teams, with recognized subspecialties of middle relievers (good for several
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