other places municipal golf courses are denounced as subsidy schemes because their fees typically do not cover their full
costs, at least not the way the money is accounted for in city budgets.
Whether these golf
courses may save money by, for example, keeping people active and thus holding down Medicare costs is not measured in city
budgets or contemplated by market ideologues. Nor is the aesthetic benefit of greenery in tightly packed cities. What is most
curious, though, is that these attacks ignore using the market to measure the value of parks. Land near urban parks typically sells
for significantly more than land without such amenities. The extra property taxes thus generated have been shown in some places
to more than make up for the untaxed value of parks even when they generate no fees.
Suggestions that municipal golf courses serve a public purpose, that they add a thread to social cohesion
and stability, are rejected out of hand. The market ideologues see only a subsidy for those affluent enough to afford golf clubsâor
children allowed on a swing without paying a fee. People who buy tickets to a movie theater, the argument goes, get no such
subsidy.
Besides, the Friedmanites say, government should not be competing with private golf
courses. The land should be sold to developers, at least in San Francisco, the money used to relieve the burden of taxes. Thomas
Sowell, the economist who holds the Friedman chair at Stanfordâs Hoover Institution, and the John Locke Society barely give a nod
to the idea of parks as amenities that help sustain a healthy society, the idea of parks championed by John Mullaly.
At the same time that public parks have atrophied in many cities for lack of public funds to maintain them, the
market for commercial ballparks is flourishing, as we shall see in the next chapter.
Chapter
6
PRIDE AND PROFITS
F ROM ST. PETERSBURG TO ST. LOUIS AND BEYOND, CITIES THAT
DID not have a big-league baseball, football, hockey, or basketball team have built
stadiums and arenas in the hope that they would come. Smaller cities, like Rochester, New York, built stadiums for less popular
sports like professional soccer, even when there was no hope the facilities could pay for themselves. Often there was no sign that
team owners had put their own money at risk.
The beneficiaries of this spending pepper the
Forbes 400 list of the wealthiest Americans. At least 27 of these billionaires own major sports teams. Nearly all of them have their
hands out.
Arthur Blank, a founder of the Home Depot, owns the Atlanta Falcons football team.
Mark Cuban, the Internet entrepreneur, owns the Dallas Mavericks basketball team. H. Wayne Huizenga, who made a fortune in
trash hauling and another with Blockbuster, owns the Miami Dolphins football team. Mickey Arison, whose Carnival line carries half
of all cruise passengers, owns the Miami Heat basketball team. They are just a few of the billionaire owners of commercial sports
teams who have stuffed gifts from the taxpayers into their already deep pockets.
The billionaire
team owners seek these payments because commercial sports is not a viable business, at least not as it is operated in America.
Although baseball, basketball, football, and hockey teams are all privately held, they disclose limited information about their
finances. From that data, one crucial fact can be distilled: while some teams are profitable, overall the sports-team industry does
not earn any profit from the market. Industry profits all come from the taxpayers.
In a market
economy, the team owners would have to adjust or cover the losses out of their own deep pockets. Instead they rely on the
kindness of taxpayers to enrich themselves at the expense of the vast majority who never attend these sporting
events.
Subsidies for sports teams have grown steadily. From 1995 through 2006, local, state,
and federal governments spent more than $10 billion subsidizing more than
costs, at least not the way the money is accounted for in city budgets.
Whether these golf
courses may save money by, for example, keeping people active and thus holding down Medicare costs is not measured in city
budgets or contemplated by market ideologues. Nor is the aesthetic benefit of greenery in tightly packed cities. What is most
curious, though, is that these attacks ignore using the market to measure the value of parks. Land near urban parks typically sells
for significantly more than land without such amenities. The extra property taxes thus generated have been shown in some places
to more than make up for the untaxed value of parks even when they generate no fees.
Suggestions that municipal golf courses serve a public purpose, that they add a thread to social cohesion
and stability, are rejected out of hand. The market ideologues see only a subsidy for those affluent enough to afford golf clubsâor
children allowed on a swing without paying a fee. People who buy tickets to a movie theater, the argument goes, get no such
subsidy.
Besides, the Friedmanites say, government should not be competing with private golf
courses. The land should be sold to developers, at least in San Francisco, the money used to relieve the burden of taxes. Thomas
Sowell, the economist who holds the Friedman chair at Stanfordâs Hoover Institution, and the John Locke Society barely give a nod
to the idea of parks as amenities that help sustain a healthy society, the idea of parks championed by John Mullaly.
At the same time that public parks have atrophied in many cities for lack of public funds to maintain them, the
market for commercial ballparks is flourishing, as we shall see in the next chapter.
Chapter
6
PRIDE AND PROFITS
F ROM ST. PETERSBURG TO ST. LOUIS AND BEYOND, CITIES THAT
DID not have a big-league baseball, football, hockey, or basketball team have built
stadiums and arenas in the hope that they would come. Smaller cities, like Rochester, New York, built stadiums for less popular
sports like professional soccer, even when there was no hope the facilities could pay for themselves. Often there was no sign that
team owners had put their own money at risk.
The beneficiaries of this spending pepper the
Forbes 400 list of the wealthiest Americans. At least 27 of these billionaires own major sports teams. Nearly all of them have their
hands out.
Arthur Blank, a founder of the Home Depot, owns the Atlanta Falcons football team.
Mark Cuban, the Internet entrepreneur, owns the Dallas Mavericks basketball team. H. Wayne Huizenga, who made a fortune in
trash hauling and another with Blockbuster, owns the Miami Dolphins football team. Mickey Arison, whose Carnival line carries half
of all cruise passengers, owns the Miami Heat basketball team. They are just a few of the billionaire owners of commercial sports
teams who have stuffed gifts from the taxpayers into their already deep pockets.
The billionaire
team owners seek these payments because commercial sports is not a viable business, at least not as it is operated in America.
Although baseball, basketball, football, and hockey teams are all privately held, they disclose limited information about their
finances. From that data, one crucial fact can be distilled: while some teams are profitable, overall the sports-team industry does
not earn any profit from the market. Industry profits all come from the taxpayers.
In a market
economy, the team owners would have to adjust or cover the losses out of their own deep pockets. Instead they rely on the
kindness of taxpayers to enrich themselves at the expense of the vast majority who never attend these sporting
events.
Subsidies for sports teams have grown steadily. From 1995 through 2006, local, state,
and federal governments spent more than $10 billion subsidizing more than
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