metageometrical concepts, resulted in stress being laid upon the active work of the mind in the construction of scientific laws and theories.”
The second alternative mentioned here was the view taken by the advocates of positivism and pragmatism. Their way out of the “bankruptcy of science” was to proclaim that mechanistic science had formulated the problem in a manner that necessarily led into a cul-de-sac; it had not correctly defined the goal of science. The unattainable something, for which the despairing solution of
“ignorabimus”
was proposed, had been recognized as a phantom, a chimera that has nothing to do with science. Through an analysis of the really successful methods of science, men such as Mach and Poincaré in Europe, and Peirce and Dewey in America, have shown that it is of no significance whatsoever whether observations are presented in terms of a certain preferred analogy. All that matters is that the statements of science are useful; the specific language and the equation by which they are formulated do not matter. Thus with the goal of science defined in the positivistic and pragmatic sense, it becomes evident that the end of the nineteenth century does not represent a crisis, but rather one phase of the gradual progress of science toward its goal, which is the creation of an instrument for predicting and controlling the phenomena.
In a certain sense this positivistic-pragmatic movement, so characteristic of the turn of the century, belonged to the group of movements that were directed against the overestimation of the role of the intellect. Professor Ralph Barton Perry very correctly said:
“Much the most sophisticated form of anti-intellectualism and at the same time the form most characteristic of our age is that form which has now come very generally to be called ‘instrumentalism’ and which is represented at present by the school of James and Dewey in America.… According to this view the intellect instead of being an oracle is a practical instrument to be judged by the success with which it does work.”
Nevertheless, the new movement, no matter whether it was called pragmatism, positivism, or instrumentalism, could be characterized as anti-intellectual only in so far as it warned against occupying the intellect with meaningless problems. The adherents said that the intellect is unable to discover the metaphysicalreality behind phenomena. But this is not a diminution of its role, since to speak of such a metaphysical reality does not make sense for science. It is sterile and leads only to confusion. The creation of an “instrument,” which is now what is meant by “science,” can be accomplished only by means of the intellect, even though we cannot produce a blueprint for discovering general principles. The discovery of laws such as the energy principle or the law of inertia is the work of a genius, like the composition of a symphony. But when the general law has been enunciated, it is then the function of the methodically proceeding intellect to make its meaning clear to all. Only the intellect can test the principle and pronounce judgment on its truth — that is, whether it is of value in realizing the aims of science.
So ends the nineteenth century. Its faith in the ability of science to reveal the ultimate reality behind phenomena was shaken; but in its place appeared the sober consolation of positivism that science had become more flexible and girded for new tasks of a boldness never dreamed of. During the twilight period characterized by a devaluation of the intellect and an increased regard for action, there appeared, like a silver glow on the horizon, the hope that a more acute logical analysis would give an entirely new form of science based on a methodically operating intellect. The twentieth century ushered in this dawn.
III
BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA IN PHYSICS
1.
Life in Bern
When Einstein took up his position at the patent office in Bern, it was in two
The second alternative mentioned here was the view taken by the advocates of positivism and pragmatism. Their way out of the “bankruptcy of science” was to proclaim that mechanistic science had formulated the problem in a manner that necessarily led into a cul-de-sac; it had not correctly defined the goal of science. The unattainable something, for which the despairing solution of
“ignorabimus”
was proposed, had been recognized as a phantom, a chimera that has nothing to do with science. Through an analysis of the really successful methods of science, men such as Mach and Poincaré in Europe, and Peirce and Dewey in America, have shown that it is of no significance whatsoever whether observations are presented in terms of a certain preferred analogy. All that matters is that the statements of science are useful; the specific language and the equation by which they are formulated do not matter. Thus with the goal of science defined in the positivistic and pragmatic sense, it becomes evident that the end of the nineteenth century does not represent a crisis, but rather one phase of the gradual progress of science toward its goal, which is the creation of an instrument for predicting and controlling the phenomena.
In a certain sense this positivistic-pragmatic movement, so characteristic of the turn of the century, belonged to the group of movements that were directed against the overestimation of the role of the intellect. Professor Ralph Barton Perry very correctly said:
“Much the most sophisticated form of anti-intellectualism and at the same time the form most characteristic of our age is that form which has now come very generally to be called ‘instrumentalism’ and which is represented at present by the school of James and Dewey in America.… According to this view the intellect instead of being an oracle is a practical instrument to be judged by the success with which it does work.”
Nevertheless, the new movement, no matter whether it was called pragmatism, positivism, or instrumentalism, could be characterized as anti-intellectual only in so far as it warned against occupying the intellect with meaningless problems. The adherents said that the intellect is unable to discover the metaphysicalreality behind phenomena. But this is not a diminution of its role, since to speak of such a metaphysical reality does not make sense for science. It is sterile and leads only to confusion. The creation of an “instrument,” which is now what is meant by “science,” can be accomplished only by means of the intellect, even though we cannot produce a blueprint for discovering general principles. The discovery of laws such as the energy principle or the law of inertia is the work of a genius, like the composition of a symphony. But when the general law has been enunciated, it is then the function of the methodically proceeding intellect to make its meaning clear to all. Only the intellect can test the principle and pronounce judgment on its truth — that is, whether it is of value in realizing the aims of science.
So ends the nineteenth century. Its faith in the ability of science to reveal the ultimate reality behind phenomena was shaken; but in its place appeared the sober consolation of positivism that science had become more flexible and girded for new tasks of a boldness never dreamed of. During the twilight period characterized by a devaluation of the intellect and an increased regard for action, there appeared, like a silver glow on the horizon, the hope that a more acute logical analysis would give an entirely new form of science based on a methodically operating intellect. The twentieth century ushered in this dawn.
III
BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA IN PHYSICS
1.
Life in Bern
When Einstein took up his position at the patent office in Bern, it was in two
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