prepared for him in advance. He modeled his speaking style on the early Bolsheviks, who could keep audiences spellbound through the sheer force of their oratory. Speaking extemporaneously provided a contrast with his immediate predecessors, who were barely able to read from prepared texts. On the other hand, it caused him to ramble, the occupational disease of an all-powerful leader who is rarely contradicted. The points he was trying to make could easily get lost in an avalanche of words. Sometimes he got carried away with his own rhetoric, forgetting the point that he intended to make.
While the new tsar had a very clear sense about what was wrong with the Russian economy, he had a much hazier idea of how to put it right. Stripped of their revolutionary rhetoric and good intentions, his early policies often boiled down to more of the same. He still proclaimed an undying faith in the socialist system of centralized distribution. His attitude to Lenin remained deeply reverential. On the subject of market economics, Western visitors found that he was practically illiterate. Given these ideological limitationsand the ingrained habits of Soviet bureaucrats, it was not surprising that the party bosses in western Siberia responded to the new leader’s criticisms and exhortations in the traditional way. They drilled hundreds more wells and increased the pressure on work crews to meet plan targets. Little attention was paid to the maintenance and repair of existing wells or the rational, long-term development of oil fields. Only token efforts were made to improve the living conditions of oil workers. Uskorenie (acceleration) became the slogan of the day.
Over the next two years oil production did increase slightly. But the frenetic drilling of new wells had the effect of making matters even more chaotic, exacerbating the problem of waterlogged fields. By 1988 Soviet production was in steep and irreversible decline. Even more alarming, at least in the short term, was a decision by Saudi Arabia in the summer of 1985 to increase its oil production dramatically. Shortly after Gorbachev’s visit to Siberia, world oil prices crashed. By the first quarter of 1986 the Soviet Union would be able to fetch no more than ten to twelve dollars a barrel for its oil, compared with a peak of nearly forty dollars in 1980. During Gorbachev’s first two years in office the country’s hard currency export earnings fell by almost a third.
Perestroika was doomed before it had even begun.
G ORBACHEV’S TRIP TO Western Siberia turned out to be important for another reason: It marked the high point of his ill-conceived antialcohol campaign, which did more to alienate the Russian people than any other single action. With hindsight, it was probably the most spectacular blunder committed by the new leadership during the early stage of perestroika.
Drink had been the scourge of Russian life for many centuries. “The greatest pleasure of the people is drunkenness, in other words forgetfulness,” noted the marquis de Custine during his visit to Russia in 1839. 67 The Brezhnev regime tacitly encouraged vodka sales, which provided a valuable source of tax revenue and helped ensure the political acquiescence of the population. Consumption of hard liquor had almost quadrupled during the Brezhnev period. By the time Gorbachev came to power, alcoholism had reached epidemic proportions. Official studies showed that 70 percent of all crimes were related to alcohol. Drink was blamed for widespread absenteeism at work, a sharp increase in the divorce rate, and a dramatic drop in male life expectancy.
The driving forces behind the antialcohol campaign were two Politburomembers who had played an important role in helping Gorbachev become general secretary, Yegor Ligachev and Mikhail Solomentsev. Ligachev was a puritan, disgusted with the moral decay that he saw all around him. He had already tried to enforce a ban on alcohol in his hometown of Tomsk. Solomentsev
While the new tsar had a very clear sense about what was wrong with the Russian economy, he had a much hazier idea of how to put it right. Stripped of their revolutionary rhetoric and good intentions, his early policies often boiled down to more of the same. He still proclaimed an undying faith in the socialist system of centralized distribution. His attitude to Lenin remained deeply reverential. On the subject of market economics, Western visitors found that he was practically illiterate. Given these ideological limitationsand the ingrained habits of Soviet bureaucrats, it was not surprising that the party bosses in western Siberia responded to the new leader’s criticisms and exhortations in the traditional way. They drilled hundreds more wells and increased the pressure on work crews to meet plan targets. Little attention was paid to the maintenance and repair of existing wells or the rational, long-term development of oil fields. Only token efforts were made to improve the living conditions of oil workers. Uskorenie (acceleration) became the slogan of the day.
Over the next two years oil production did increase slightly. But the frenetic drilling of new wells had the effect of making matters even more chaotic, exacerbating the problem of waterlogged fields. By 1988 Soviet production was in steep and irreversible decline. Even more alarming, at least in the short term, was a decision by Saudi Arabia in the summer of 1985 to increase its oil production dramatically. Shortly after Gorbachev’s visit to Siberia, world oil prices crashed. By the first quarter of 1986 the Soviet Union would be able to fetch no more than ten to twelve dollars a barrel for its oil, compared with a peak of nearly forty dollars in 1980. During Gorbachev’s first two years in office the country’s hard currency export earnings fell by almost a third.
Perestroika was doomed before it had even begun.
G ORBACHEV’S TRIP TO Western Siberia turned out to be important for another reason: It marked the high point of his ill-conceived antialcohol campaign, which did more to alienate the Russian people than any other single action. With hindsight, it was probably the most spectacular blunder committed by the new leadership during the early stage of perestroika.
Drink had been the scourge of Russian life for many centuries. “The greatest pleasure of the people is drunkenness, in other words forgetfulness,” noted the marquis de Custine during his visit to Russia in 1839. 67 The Brezhnev regime tacitly encouraged vodka sales, which provided a valuable source of tax revenue and helped ensure the political acquiescence of the population. Consumption of hard liquor had almost quadrupled during the Brezhnev period. By the time Gorbachev came to power, alcoholism had reached epidemic proportions. Official studies showed that 70 percent of all crimes were related to alcohol. Drink was blamed for widespread absenteeism at work, a sharp increase in the divorce rate, and a dramatic drop in male life expectancy.
The driving forces behind the antialcohol campaign were two Politburomembers who had played an important role in helping Gorbachev become general secretary, Yegor Ligachev and Mikhail Solomentsev. Ligachev was a puritan, disgusted with the moral decay that he saw all around him. He had already tried to enforce a ban on alcohol in his hometown of Tomsk. Solomentsev
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