Do Not Ask What Good We Do: Inside the U.S. House of Representatives by Robert Draper Page A
Authors: Robert Draper
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Speaker Pelosi announced in February that the House would proceed with the bill, which would include a provision that capped greenhouse gas emissions. Blue Dog Democrats protested that their constituents were concerned about the economy, not climate change. One of the most prominent Blue Dogs, Tennessee’s John Tanner, collared Majority Leader Hoyer on the House floor and, with a sweeping wave of his arm to encompass some of the more electorally vulnerable newcomers, said, “Steny! You are killing these freshmen! They’re not gonna come back after this!”
Hoyer agreed with Tanner’s sentiment but knew Pelosi’s determination from painful experience. For her part, the Speaker responded that at bottom, the bill was about “four things: jobs, jobs, jobs, and jobs.”
Obama’s then–chief of staff, Rahm Emanuel, was among the unconvinced. He begged Pelosi not to introduce energy legislation before health care, which would by itself be a heavy political lift.
Pelosi replied, “I’ve got the votes.”
Meaning: she would find the votes, eventually. After the Energy andCommerce Committee produced a “discussion draft” of the energy legislation in late March, Democratic chief deputy whip Diana DeGette’s office tallied the bill’s supporters as a meager eighty Democrats and no Republicans. Pelosi continued to work her caucus, cutting deals that would thread the needle between the opposing concerns of the Sierra Club and more conservative Democrats. The number moved into triple digits. Pelosi kept pressing her colleagues. When the whip count exceeded two hundred, Pelosi scheduled a vote on the House floor for June 26, 2009.
The day before the vote, Obama threw a Hawaii-themed congressional picnic on the White House lawn. One by one, undecided Democrats with their leis and their cocktails were escorted to the Oval Office by White House legislative liaisons to be subjected to the president’s persuasions. But Obama was unable to turn anyone. A whip staffer approached DeGette and told her that Pelosi was going to make a final decision at ten that evening on whether to bring the energy bill to the floor.
“By my count we’ve got 208, maybe 209,” sighed the chief deputy whip. “It’s her decision, but we don’t have the votes.”
What the Speaker had not told DeGette, or apparently anyone else, was that Pelosi on her own had quietly met with a group of moderate Republicans and had procured eight of their votes. The bill went to the House floor on June 26, passing by a vote of 219 to 212.
It was a remarkable victory—but for whom? When the final tally was announced by the House clerk, several Republicans began chanting, “BTU! BTU! BTU!”—referring to the controversial 1993 bill that taxed the heat content of fuels, or BTUs, and which House Democrats had passed at the behest of President Bill Clinton. That bill had subsequently died in the Senate, serving only as a political millstone for the Democrats during the 1994 midterms. Numerous colleagues had pled with Pelosi not to “BTU” them with an easily demagogued cap-and-trade bill that stood little chance of passage in the upper body.
Pelosi had not budged. Promoting clean energy and reducing greenhouse gases were fundamental progressive values, she would remind them. This is why they were here, to do big and difficult things. If not now, then when? Perhaps their actions would spur the Senateto action—but regardless, the House couldn’t wait around to see what their colleagues on the other side of the building would do. They had to move the agenda.
And so they did, after which Nancy Pelosi’s “signature issue” was dead on arrival in the Senate. Meanwhile, 467,000 Americans lost their jobs during the month of June 2009. The unemployment figure now stood at 9.5 percent.
And between the $780 billion stimulus and the “cap-and-tax bill,” the suddenly energized Republicans had arrived at a winning narrative: The Democrats don’t care about
Hoyer agreed with Tanner’s sentiment but knew Pelosi’s determination from painful experience. For her part, the Speaker responded that at bottom, the bill was about “four things: jobs, jobs, jobs, and jobs.”
Obama’s then–chief of staff, Rahm Emanuel, was among the unconvinced. He begged Pelosi not to introduce energy legislation before health care, which would by itself be a heavy political lift.
Pelosi replied, “I’ve got the votes.”
Meaning: she would find the votes, eventually. After the Energy andCommerce Committee produced a “discussion draft” of the energy legislation in late March, Democratic chief deputy whip Diana DeGette’s office tallied the bill’s supporters as a meager eighty Democrats and no Republicans. Pelosi continued to work her caucus, cutting deals that would thread the needle between the opposing concerns of the Sierra Club and more conservative Democrats. The number moved into triple digits. Pelosi kept pressing her colleagues. When the whip count exceeded two hundred, Pelosi scheduled a vote on the House floor for June 26, 2009.
The day before the vote, Obama threw a Hawaii-themed congressional picnic on the White House lawn. One by one, undecided Democrats with their leis and their cocktails were escorted to the Oval Office by White House legislative liaisons to be subjected to the president’s persuasions. But Obama was unable to turn anyone. A whip staffer approached DeGette and told her that Pelosi was going to make a final decision at ten that evening on whether to bring the energy bill to the floor.
“By my count we’ve got 208, maybe 209,” sighed the chief deputy whip. “It’s her decision, but we don’t have the votes.”
What the Speaker had not told DeGette, or apparently anyone else, was that Pelosi on her own had quietly met with a group of moderate Republicans and had procured eight of their votes. The bill went to the House floor on June 26, passing by a vote of 219 to 212.
It was a remarkable victory—but for whom? When the final tally was announced by the House clerk, several Republicans began chanting, “BTU! BTU! BTU!”—referring to the controversial 1993 bill that taxed the heat content of fuels, or BTUs, and which House Democrats had passed at the behest of President Bill Clinton. That bill had subsequently died in the Senate, serving only as a political millstone for the Democrats during the 1994 midterms. Numerous colleagues had pled with Pelosi not to “BTU” them with an easily demagogued cap-and-trade bill that stood little chance of passage in the upper body.
Pelosi had not budged. Promoting clean energy and reducing greenhouse gases were fundamental progressive values, she would remind them. This is why they were here, to do big and difficult things. If not now, then when? Perhaps their actions would spur the Senateto action—but regardless, the House couldn’t wait around to see what their colleagues on the other side of the building would do. They had to move the agenda.
And so they did, after which Nancy Pelosi’s “signature issue” was dead on arrival in the Senate. Meanwhile, 467,000 Americans lost their jobs during the month of June 2009. The unemployment figure now stood at 9.5 percent.
And between the $780 billion stimulus and the “cap-and-tax bill,” the suddenly energized Republicans had arrived at a winning narrative: The Democrats don’t care about
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