on imposing all of the hardships of war onto themselves, they will be very hesitant to begin such an evil adventure. In contrast, under a constitution where the subject is not a citizen, which is thus not republican, it is the easiest thing in the world, because the sovereign is not a citizen of the state but its owner, his dining, hunting, castles, parties, etc., will not suffer in the least from the war, and he can thus go to war for meaningless reasons, as if it were a pleasure trip. (Gesammelte Werke in zwolf Banden, Wilhelm Weischedel, ed. [Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1964], vol. 11, pp. 205f.)
In fact the opposite is true: the substitution of a republic for a monarchy does not imply less government power, or even self-rule. It implies the replacement of bad private-government administration by worse public-government administration. On the illusionary character of Kant's and others' views to the contrary and the "positive" historical correlation between democracy and increased militarization and war, see Michael Howard War in European History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976); John F.C. Fuller, War and Western Civilization 1832-1932 (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries, 1969); idem, The Conduct of War, 1789-1961 (New York: Da Capo Press, 1992); also Ekkehard Krippendorff, Staat und Krieg (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1985).
In fact, writes Guglielmo Ferrero of the eighteenth century,
war became limited and circumscribed by a system of precise rules. It was definitely regarded as a kind of single combat between the two armies, the civil population being merely spectators. Pillage, requisitions, and acts of violence against the population were forbidden in the home country as well as in the enemy country. Each army established depots in its rear in carefully chosen towns, shifting them as it moved about; . . . Conscription existed only in a rudimentary and sporadic form,... Soldiers being scarce and hard to find, everything was done to ensure their quality by a long, patient and meticulous training, but as this was costly, it rendered them very valuable, and it was necessary to let as few be killed as possible. Having to economize their men, generals tried to avoid fighting battles. The object of warfare was the execution of skillful maneuvers and not the annihilation of the adversary; a campaign without battles and without loss of life, a victory obtained by a clever combination of movements, was considered the crowning achievement of this art, the ideal pattern of perfection. 35 ... It was avarice and calculation that made war more humane.... [W]ar became a kind of game between sovereigns. A war was a game with its rules and its stakes—a territory, an inheritance, a throne, a treaty. The loser paid, but a just proportion was always kept between the value of the stake and the risks to be taken, and the parties were always on guard against the kind of obstinacy which makes a player lose his head. They tried to keep the game in hand and to know when to stop. 36
34 Howard, War in European History, p. 73. For a similar assessment see Fuller, The Conduct of War:
So completely was civil life divorced from war that, in his A Sentimental Journey through France and Italy, Laurence Sterne relates that during the Seven Years' War [1756-1763] he left London for Paris with so much precipitation that "it never entered my mind that we were at war with France," and that on his arrival in Dover it suddenly occurred to him he was without a passport. However, this did not impede his journey, and when he arrived at Versailles, the Duke of Choiseul, French Foreign Minister, had one sent to him. In Pans he was cheered by his French admirers, and in Frontignac was invited to theatricals by the English colony, (pp. 22-23)
35 See on this also Fuller, The Conduct of War, chap. 1. Fuller here (p. 23) quotes Daniel Defoe to the effect that often "armies of fifty thousand men of a side stand at bay within view of one another, and spend a
In fact the opposite is true: the substitution of a republic for a monarchy does not imply less government power, or even self-rule. It implies the replacement of bad private-government administration by worse public-government administration. On the illusionary character of Kant's and others' views to the contrary and the "positive" historical correlation between democracy and increased militarization and war, see Michael Howard War in European History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976); John F.C. Fuller, War and Western Civilization 1832-1932 (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries, 1969); idem, The Conduct of War, 1789-1961 (New York: Da Capo Press, 1992); also Ekkehard Krippendorff, Staat und Krieg (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1985).
In fact, writes Guglielmo Ferrero of the eighteenth century,
war became limited and circumscribed by a system of precise rules. It was definitely regarded as a kind of single combat between the two armies, the civil population being merely spectators. Pillage, requisitions, and acts of violence against the population were forbidden in the home country as well as in the enemy country. Each army established depots in its rear in carefully chosen towns, shifting them as it moved about; . . . Conscription existed only in a rudimentary and sporadic form,... Soldiers being scarce and hard to find, everything was done to ensure their quality by a long, patient and meticulous training, but as this was costly, it rendered them very valuable, and it was necessary to let as few be killed as possible. Having to economize their men, generals tried to avoid fighting battles. The object of warfare was the execution of skillful maneuvers and not the annihilation of the adversary; a campaign without battles and without loss of life, a victory obtained by a clever combination of movements, was considered the crowning achievement of this art, the ideal pattern of perfection. 35 ... It was avarice and calculation that made war more humane.... [W]ar became a kind of game between sovereigns. A war was a game with its rules and its stakes—a territory, an inheritance, a throne, a treaty. The loser paid, but a just proportion was always kept between the value of the stake and the risks to be taken, and the parties were always on guard against the kind of obstinacy which makes a player lose his head. They tried to keep the game in hand and to know when to stop. 36
34 Howard, War in European History, p. 73. For a similar assessment see Fuller, The Conduct of War:
So completely was civil life divorced from war that, in his A Sentimental Journey through France and Italy, Laurence Sterne relates that during the Seven Years' War [1756-1763] he left London for Paris with so much precipitation that "it never entered my mind that we were at war with France," and that on his arrival in Dover it suddenly occurred to him he was without a passport. However, this did not impede his journey, and when he arrived at Versailles, the Duke of Choiseul, French Foreign Minister, had one sent to him. In Pans he was cheered by his French admirers, and in Frontignac was invited to theatricals by the English colony, (pp. 22-23)
35 See on this also Fuller, The Conduct of War, chap. 1. Fuller here (p. 23) quotes Daniel Defoe to the effect that often "armies of fifty thousand men of a side stand at bay within view of one another, and spend a
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