displayed the pressure levels in each of the missileâs four tanks. Holder pushed the buttons on the PTPMU and recorded the numbers in his log book. For some reason, the pressure in the stage 1 fuel tank seemed low.
It was 6:40 in the evening, about ten minutes after the first Klaxon had sounded. Ronald Fuller was going through all three checklists, too. He closed the blast valveâsealing the ventilation system, cutting off the control center from the air outdoorsâand began to set up a portable vapor detector near blast door 8. It would warn if toxic fumes were seeping into the room.
The gate phone rang, and Childers answered it. The PTS crew topside wanted to leave the complex. Childers opened the gate for them and then returned to the fuel vapor checklist. He couldnât understand why the purge fan in the silo wouldnât go on. The purge fan was supposed to clear out any fuel vapors. He kept pushing the PURGE button but nothing happened. Then he remembered that if there was a fire, they didnât want the fan to go on. It would pull fresh air into the silo and feed the fire.
âCan my people come back into the control center?â Heineman asked. Childers said yes. Heâd thought it was useful to keep Powell, Plumb, and the others in the blast lock, monitoring the vapor levels on the panel. But then he remembered that the MSA automatically shut off whenever the sprays went on, so that water wouldnât be sucked into the vapor sensors. Too many things seemed to be happening at once; it felt hard to stay on top of them all. Powell and Plumb entered the control center in their RFHCOs, Hamm and Lester in thermal underwear. In the rush to get out of the blast lock, the two had left their RFHCOs in boxes on the floor there. Blast door 8 was swiftly closed and locked. Heineman joined his men, and the group huddled near the door.
âThereâs got to be a malfunction,â Childers said, three or four times. Too many warning lights were flashing at once. But even if it was a malfunction, the crew had to act as though the hazards were real. Childers asked Serrano if heâd ever plotted a toxic corridor on a map.
Serrano replied that heâd once taken a class on it.
âWell, get over here,â Childers said. âYouâre going to watch me do it.â
With a map, a compass, a grease pencil, and a protractor, Childers started to plot on a map where a cloud of fuel, smoke, or oxidizer would travel outdoors. The wind speed was almost zero, good news for the nearby houses and farms but not for the crew. A toxic cloud would hover and swirl directly above the missile complex.
Captain Mazzaro was still on the phone to the command post, where a Missile Potential Hazard Team was being formed. At the direction of the wing commander, the officers and airmen on the base who knew the most about the Titan II were being recalled to duty: maintenance and operations supervisors, the chief of safety, the chief of missile engineers, an electrical engineer, a bioenvironmental engineer, a backup missile combat crew, among others. Security police were calling homes and searching classrooms to gather the team. And a Missile Potential Hazard Net was being establishedâa conference call linking the command post at Little Rock with experts at SAC headquarters in Omaha, the Ogden Air Logistics Center at Hill Air Force Base in Utah, and the headquarters of the Eighth Air Force at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. One of the command postâsfirst decisions was to send a Missile Alarm Response Team (MART) to the launch complex. A pair of security officers stationed at a nearby missile site grabbed their gas masks and hurried to Damascus.
While Fuller was setting up the portable vapor detector near the blast door, he overheard one of the PTS crew say something about a dropped socket. Fuller asked what had happened in the silo. After hearing the story, Fuller said they needed to tell the
It was 6:40 in the evening, about ten minutes after the first Klaxon had sounded. Ronald Fuller was going through all three checklists, too. He closed the blast valveâsealing the ventilation system, cutting off the control center from the air outdoorsâand began to set up a portable vapor detector near blast door 8. It would warn if toxic fumes were seeping into the room.
The gate phone rang, and Childers answered it. The PTS crew topside wanted to leave the complex. Childers opened the gate for them and then returned to the fuel vapor checklist. He couldnât understand why the purge fan in the silo wouldnât go on. The purge fan was supposed to clear out any fuel vapors. He kept pushing the PURGE button but nothing happened. Then he remembered that if there was a fire, they didnât want the fan to go on. It would pull fresh air into the silo and feed the fire.
âCan my people come back into the control center?â Heineman asked. Childers said yes. Heâd thought it was useful to keep Powell, Plumb, and the others in the blast lock, monitoring the vapor levels on the panel. But then he remembered that the MSA automatically shut off whenever the sprays went on, so that water wouldnât be sucked into the vapor sensors. Too many things seemed to be happening at once; it felt hard to stay on top of them all. Powell and Plumb entered the control center in their RFHCOs, Hamm and Lester in thermal underwear. In the rush to get out of the blast lock, the two had left their RFHCOs in boxes on the floor there. Blast door 8 was swiftly closed and locked. Heineman joined his men, and the group huddled near the door.
âThereâs got to be a malfunction,â Childers said, three or four times. Too many warning lights were flashing at once. But even if it was a malfunction, the crew had to act as though the hazards were real. Childers asked Serrano if heâd ever plotted a toxic corridor on a map.
Serrano replied that heâd once taken a class on it.
âWell, get over here,â Childers said. âYouâre going to watch me do it.â
With a map, a compass, a grease pencil, and a protractor, Childers started to plot on a map where a cloud of fuel, smoke, or oxidizer would travel outdoors. The wind speed was almost zero, good news for the nearby houses and farms but not for the crew. A toxic cloud would hover and swirl directly above the missile complex.
Captain Mazzaro was still on the phone to the command post, where a Missile Potential Hazard Team was being formed. At the direction of the wing commander, the officers and airmen on the base who knew the most about the Titan II were being recalled to duty: maintenance and operations supervisors, the chief of safety, the chief of missile engineers, an electrical engineer, a bioenvironmental engineer, a backup missile combat crew, among others. Security police were calling homes and searching classrooms to gather the team. And a Missile Potential Hazard Net was being establishedâa conference call linking the command post at Little Rock with experts at SAC headquarters in Omaha, the Ogden Air Logistics Center at Hill Air Force Base in Utah, and the headquarters of the Eighth Air Force at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. One of the command postâsfirst decisions was to send a Missile Alarm Response Team (MART) to the launch complex. A pair of security officers stationed at a nearby missile site grabbed their gas masks and hurried to Damascus.
While Fuller was setting up the portable vapor detector near the blast door, he overheard one of the PTS crew say something about a dropped socket. Fuller asked what had happened in the silo. After hearing the story, Fuller said they needed to tell the
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