Clouds of Deceit by Joan Smith Page A

back in Britain is not mentioned.
    The Torlesse report is dated 20 March 1953. Thirteen days before,
The Times
reported an Admiralty announcement that
Campania, Narvik, Tracker
and
Zeebrugge
‘still carry some evidence of their association’ with the atomic explosion at the Monte Bello Islands. ‘Although they were outside the range of the direct effects of the explosion,’ the Admiralty said, ‘it was necessary afterwards for the ships to enter water which had become contaminated by the radioactive products of the explosion. As was expected, this deposited a certain amount of radioactivity in those parts of the ship coming into contact with sea water, such as the ship’s bottom and, inside the ship, saltwater pipe systems and fittings.’
    (In fact, a special warning had to be issued to men working in the engine rooms of the ships after intakes were found to have taken in contaminated sea water, the Royal Commission was told by Major-General Alec Walkling in January 1985.)
    At the time, the Admiralty went on to say reassuringly that, ‘as contact with radioactivity was premeditated and controlled and several months’ natural decay has occurred since the event, the residual contamination is now so light as to be almost negligible and does not affect the serviceability or habitability of the ships.’
    Even so, to avoid potential risk to the health of men required to carry out repairs in future, the royal dockyards had been asked to remove the contamination. ‘Precautions will be taken to obviate health risks to the men doing the work,’ the Admiralty stated.
    The Times
went on to report the cheerful news that ‘it was pointed out at the Admiralty yesterday that the effect of the contamination has not prevented the ships remaining in commission since the Monte Bello test, and that all have continued to have complements living on board.’
    Torlesse’s report does not deal with the implications for the health of the people who lived on the four contaminated ships during the long journey home, or of those servicemen who were still stationed on board at the time of the announcement. If the ships were sufficiently radioactive five months after the explosion to need decontamination, how much more contaminated would they have been in the weeks after the test? Nor does it seem that the Admiralty had a very clear idea of how todeal with the problem, as
The Times
story goes on to make clear.
    â€˜The dockyards have had no previous practical experience of this work,’ the Admiralty statement admits, but then looks on the bright side. These ships, although only ‘lukewarm’, ‘will provide a most valuable training exercise for the organization which must be set up for the handling and decontamination, should the need arise, of the really “hot” ships which must be anticipated in a future war in which atomic weapons may be used. It will also be an opportunity for practical training for the passive defence organizations.’
    It is clear from Torlesse’s report that contamination eventually spread from the water around the northern islands in the group southwards for several miles. But this was not the only way in which ships could become contaminated. Torlesse’s report reveals that ‘a certain amount of gear and equipment used by special parties in the contaminated area, together with some contaminated equipment which was salvaged, could not successfully be decontaminated. Such gear was stored in the radioactive waste store in
Tracker
to await dumping at sea.’
    Lightly contaminated protective clothing was kept on board
Tracker
and brought back to Britain for decontamination at home. Rubber boots, and gloves, were cleaned on board ship, where they responded ‘fairly well’ to treatment to remove radioactivity. ‘Heavily contaminated’ suits and other woven items were taken off by the people wearing them when they arrived