Chasing Perfection: A Behind-the-Scenes Look at the High-Stakes Game of Creating an NBA Champion by Andy Glockner Page B

a director of analytics to help himmanage the whole process.
    When the announcement of Joel Justus’s hire was made, along with the subsequent proclamation that Kentucky would utilize a platoon system in which two distinct groups of five would come on and off the court together and effectively split up the two hundred total game minutes available, the reaction was that this was more of Calipari’s marketing gimmicks. It wasn’t a totally unfair assumption. There certainly was a sexy, promotional component to the role, which fit into the super-aggressive way Calipari has billed his program, which has generated five Elite Eight appearances, four Final Fours, a national title, and thirteen NBA lottery picks in his six seasons in charge. But Calipari insisted there was significant substancebehind this particular sell, that platooning and having a dedicated analytics director was the best way to win now and get as many of his talented players to the NBA. In doing so, Kentucky became one of the more ambitious teams at the college level in trying to make targeted use of analytics to help its players and its performance.
    “Well, the idea wasn’t a marketing [one]. There was only one thing I was trying to do—put numbers in front of our team to get them to understand that what we were doing is in their best interests, and that their efficiency numbers would be off the charts if they did this right,” Calipari said, as the experiment continued to unfold around him. “And that no one would be hurt by less minutes; you would be more efficient. And so that’s why we did it.
    “The numbers that Joel can come up with are better, just logical things that no one on the staff would just say. Every kind of rotation, every kind of combination, we keep score. So as much as we think this combination or that combination is doing well, you look and you say, ‘Damn.’ They look like they’re doing better than they are. You know what I’m saying? They move the ball better, they space better, yeah. But the numbers don’t foretell that—the other team may not look as good, but the spread is way bigger when they’re in. So those are the kind of things that we’re able to see and monitor and also let them know, to keep them [informed].”
    Calipari’s hard sell to his players was that NBA personnel care about percentages and rates more than gross numbers, and his players would have a huge opportunity to post impressive stat rates because they would only be playing for four- to five-minute spurts in a game, and not playing more than maybe twenty-three or twenty-four minutes most nights. He also relentlessly harped on his players’ on-court effort as a key factor in their draft status.
    “I told some of these guys, if you score twenty a game, but if you have no motor, you’re done,” Calipari said. “If you scored ten a game, but your motor’s off the charts, you’re going to be a top-ten pick. But, let me say this. [Having] the motor is way harder than scoring.It’s hard. And they break down. ‘Can’t I just shoot it more?’ ‘No, I’m sorry. Sorry, it doesn’t work that way.’ It’s amazing. And when I stop them all the time at practice, and say [to an assistant], ‘Now, why would he do it this way instead of the way we’re talking?’ ‘Because it’s easier.’ ‘No kidding.’ Just whatever’s the easiest route. But there is no easy route. It’s not easy. The numbers show the hard workers, the aggressive, attacking players, are the guys they want, and those numbers show in all these stats. But the only way you get those stats is you just play harder.”
    The platoon system worked decently for a chunk of the nonconference schedule, but things changed a bit once forward Alex Poythress injured his knee and was lost for the season. There also was the dilemma in the backcourt, where often the shooting provided by Tyler Ulis and Devin Booker was more effective than what twins Andrew and Aaron Harrison were providing.