Austerlitz: Napoleon and the Eagles of Europe by Ian Castle Page B

bodies of the enemy. There could now be no doubt that the French move from the Black Forest was a feint and Kienmayer had located the main body approaching from Stuttgart and beyond. Yet Kienmayer was still unaware that French troops under Bernadotte had, on 3 October, entered Ansbach, the Prussian territory that Francis had assured Mack was inviolable. Seemingly unperturbed by the news of the French approach, Mack issued orders for the army to swing into new positions behind the Danube facing north. Schwarzenberg’s corps was to occupy an area just south of Ulm, Riesch’s men headed for positions in and around the city, while Werneck’s command received orders to line the Danube between Leipheim and Günzburg. All units were required to take up these new positions by 8 October. To strengthen the position, Austrian troops removed planking from the bridge at Elchingen on 3 October, then two days later destroyed the bridge atThalfingen. This meant the first intact bridges east of Ulm stood at Leipheim and Günzburg, at least 23 miles away.
    As it now appeared likely that the Austrian army was redeploying on the Danube, and he knew of Austrian activity north of the river (Kienmayer’s troops), Napoleon demanded that Murat bring in some of these men: ‘What I want is information – send out agents, spies, and above all make some prisoners.’ 1 But again the Austrians avoided capture.
    By 5 October the entire Grande Armée occupied a front narrowed to 65 miles, the only obstruction between them and the Danube formed by the 16,000 men of Kienmayer’s corps strung out over 35 miles between Nördlingen and Eichstadt. In fact it was on the extreme far right of this thin Austrian line, where little likelihood of danger was expected, that a weak detachment of three battalions of infantry and a regiment of hussars under Generalmajor Nostitz discovered Bernadotte’s army of 37,000 men rapidly approaching from Prussian territory. Clearly Kienmayer could not contain this overwhelming force massing against him and on 6 October he withdrew rapidly across the Danube at Neuburg, sending detachments to protect the bridges at Donauwörth, Rain and Ingolstadt. Later that day, Vandamme’s division of IV Corps arrived at Harburg, only 5 miles from Donauwörth. Alerted to their proximity, the Austrians in the town began breaking up the bridge, but around 8.00pm – before the task was even half completed – French troops arrived in overwhelming numbers and drove the defenders away. By the following morning the bridge over the Danube at Donauwörth was secure and repaired. While Vandamme consolidated this important gain, the entire French army hovered within a day’s march of the Danube.
    The march had been a tremendous achievement for the French army, yet it had not been without problems. The opening of the month of October brought a great change in the weather. The warm sunny days of September gave way to rain, cold winds and even a little snow, and Napoleon’s determination that the army should proceed with all speed allowed little time for foraging. One man who experienced the hardships of the march left this revealing description:
‘The extremity of fatigue, the want of food, the terrible weather, the trouble of the marauders – nothing was wanting … The brigades, even the regiments were sometimes dispersed, the order to reunite arrived late, because it had to filter through so many offices. Hence the troops were marching day and night, and I saw for the first time men sleeping as they marched. I could not have believed it possible. Thus we reached our destination without having eaten anything and finding nothing to eat. It was all very well for Berthier to write: ‘In the war of invasion as the emperor makes it, there are no magazines; it is the Generals to provide themselves from the country as they traverse it’; but the Generals had neither the time nor means toprocure regularly what was required for the needs of such a