A Million Bullets: The Real Story of the British Army in Afghanistan by James Fergusson Page A
Authors: James Fergusson
Tags: United States, History, England, Military, Europe, middle east, Great Britain, Ireland, 21st Century, Modern (16th-21st Centuries), Afghan War
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looked good on planning schedules, the camps were separated by their own gates and perimeter fences, so that in practice there was little contact between them. Morale at Tombstone was never high. When pep-talking political dignitaries visited Bastion – Des Browne, say, or David Cameron as Leader of the Opposition – the liaison officers were careful to include a quick visit to Tombstone on their itineraries. But there was no disguising the fact that the OMLT camp was an adjunct to the main event across the road. The ANA units housed there looked, and felt, dispiritingly like a forgotten army.
The recruits, most of them drawn from poor, non-Pashtun areas to the north of the country, were badly paid and sometimes of very questionable quality. On one occasion, a group of ANA turned up for target practice on the nearby rifle-range without any of the ammunition recently assigned to them. On enquiry, the OMLT officer in charge learned that they had sold it all in the local market. Their spokesman was genuinely astonished when the officer remonstrated with them. 'But we got a very good price for it!' he said. Another OMLT officer, Captain Will Libby of the Royal Green Jackets, later explained to me how most of his men could not drive. 'My ANA company arrived in a convoy from Kandahar in early May. When they caught sight of Tombstone, two kilometres out, they broke formation and made a charge for the gates. Four of their vehicles crashed.' They tended not to wear watches. Few could read or write. Many of them were short-sighted and wore no glasses; others were in poor health, with disorders as serious as tuberculosis, for which they had never been screened. It was not uncommon, when an inspection or parade was called and the head-count did not tally, for an OMLT officer to be informed quite matter-of-factly that the missing man had died in the night.
The worst problem, however – at least in Libby's view – was their almost total lack of esprit de corps . 'It wasn't their fault. Their initial training was done up in Kabul under ISAF supervision. The officers were trained by the French, but the junior NCOs and all the rest were trained separately, by the Canadians, so they didn't know their officers from Adam. And that's reckoned to be an essential part of training in most Western armies . . . At Bastion we focused on the importance of bonding, teaching NCOs to teach their blokes. But the officers got selected on nepotistic lines . . . there was a huge disparity between the best and worst of them in terms of experience and quality. The lack of kit and preparation led to units being hastily bolted together, which led to lack of trust between men and NCOs and officers.'
For whatever reason, of the 1,100-strong ANA kandak , or battalion, deployed with the British on Herrick 4, 360 had deserted by July. Fixtures and fittings at Camp Tombstone, which had been built specifically for them by the Americans at a cost of £68 million, were reportedly stripped out and stolen; even some washroom taps and sinks went missing.
Most worrying of all was evidence that, like the ANP, certain members of the ANA were guilty of freelance banditry on the roads – an allegation apparently confirmed when a BBC correspondent, David Loyn, covertly filmed an unofficial ANA checkpoint in action. Loyn was succinct in his criticism when he asked, 'What is the point of sending our young men to die in support of a regime that cannot begin to police itself?' Some of the ANA highwaymen, no doubt, were deserters who had held on to their useful uniforms, but as far as their victims were concerned this made no difference. Who could tell which was which? It meant that public confidence in the new Afghan Army was being eroded long before it was even fully formed.
Despite all that, the picture Libby painted of the ANA was not entirely negative.
'They were asked to fight alongside people they didn't know. They didn't know where they were going, or why, sometimes.
The recruits, most of them drawn from poor, non-Pashtun areas to the north of the country, were badly paid and sometimes of very questionable quality. On one occasion, a group of ANA turned up for target practice on the nearby rifle-range without any of the ammunition recently assigned to them. On enquiry, the OMLT officer in charge learned that they had sold it all in the local market. Their spokesman was genuinely astonished when the officer remonstrated with them. 'But we got a very good price for it!' he said. Another OMLT officer, Captain Will Libby of the Royal Green Jackets, later explained to me how most of his men could not drive. 'My ANA company arrived in a convoy from Kandahar in early May. When they caught sight of Tombstone, two kilometres out, they broke formation and made a charge for the gates. Four of their vehicles crashed.' They tended not to wear watches. Few could read or write. Many of them were short-sighted and wore no glasses; others were in poor health, with disorders as serious as tuberculosis, for which they had never been screened. It was not uncommon, when an inspection or parade was called and the head-count did not tally, for an OMLT officer to be informed quite matter-of-factly that the missing man had died in the night.
The worst problem, however – at least in Libby's view – was their almost total lack of esprit de corps . 'It wasn't their fault. Their initial training was done up in Kabul under ISAF supervision. The officers were trained by the French, but the junior NCOs and all the rest were trained separately, by the Canadians, so they didn't know their officers from Adam. And that's reckoned to be an essential part of training in most Western armies . . . At Bastion we focused on the importance of bonding, teaching NCOs to teach their blokes. But the officers got selected on nepotistic lines . . . there was a huge disparity between the best and worst of them in terms of experience and quality. The lack of kit and preparation led to units being hastily bolted together, which led to lack of trust between men and NCOs and officers.'
For whatever reason, of the 1,100-strong ANA kandak , or battalion, deployed with the British on Herrick 4, 360 had deserted by July. Fixtures and fittings at Camp Tombstone, which had been built specifically for them by the Americans at a cost of £68 million, were reportedly stripped out and stolen; even some washroom taps and sinks went missing.
Most worrying of all was evidence that, like the ANP, certain members of the ANA were guilty of freelance banditry on the roads – an allegation apparently confirmed when a BBC correspondent, David Loyn, covertly filmed an unofficial ANA checkpoint in action. Loyn was succinct in his criticism when he asked, 'What is the point of sending our young men to die in support of a regime that cannot begin to police itself?' Some of the ANA highwaymen, no doubt, were deserters who had held on to their useful uniforms, but as far as their victims were concerned this made no difference. Who could tell which was which? It meant that public confidence in the new Afghan Army was being eroded long before it was even fully formed.
Despite all that, the picture Libby painted of the ANA was not entirely negative.
'They were asked to fight alongside people they didn't know. They didn't know where they were going, or why, sometimes.
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