A Doctor in The House: A Memoir of Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad by Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad Page B
Authors: Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad
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police would come to visit them in their dormitory or call them in for questioning. I saw for myself how this affected their studies, but at the time we all accepted the fact that if you were a communist, the Government would take action against you.
Yet most people in Malaya were very anti-communist. They remembered that after the Japanese surrender, the communists had tried to rule the country. This was also a time of political awakening in Singapore. With the island’s large Chinese majority, the communists seemed set to dominate Singapore politics for good. They quickly gained control of the trade unions and the Chinese schools. Indian trade unionists in Singapore also teamed up with the MCP-controlled unions, in particular the Harbour Workers Union. Had Singapore become communist, the insurrection in Malaya would have been stepped up.
Meanwhile, the guerrillas were getting more active and their well-planned ambushes resulted in many security personnel being killed. British and other Commonwealth troops, together with Malay soldiers, were among the casualties. The guerrillas were well organised—a sure sign that they were receiving support from sympathisers among the Chinese population. Called the Min Yuen, or People’s Movement, this support arm of the party was made up of Malayan Chinese who worked silently to provide food, medical supplies and money to the guerrillas.
The British authorities responded to the communist challenge by declaring a state of Emergency. Under this rule, ordinary operations of the law were largely suspended. Communist suspects, for example, could be detained without trial for as long as it pleased the Government, a move that would be the precursor to the Internal Security Act (ISA). [3] The situation served the British well for, as far as they were concerned, the longer the Emergency went on, the longer ordinary laws could be ignored. The power of the Government would be unlimited and would also be free from scrutiny by the courts. There was no right to challenge arrests and detentions in court during colonial days and even after Independence. It was only after I became Prime Minister that, in a case brought by lawyer and Opposition politician Karpal Singh, the age-old legal mechanism of habeas corpus [4] was invoked to obtain the release of ISA detainees.
The British, however, made their classic error of underestimating the strength of an opposing Asian force. The determination of the MCP should have been amply clear: there was an escalation in trade union activities and in the intimidation of the workers. In response, the British brought in trade unionists from the UK to advise the workers and their leaders, which was clearly an exercise in futility. When a dispute arose between the workers and the General Transport Company (GTC)—a British company which operated buses in Kuala Lumpur—the communist trade union activists simply sabotaged the vehicles, puncturing the tires and damaging the engines. But the strike was only in town where the GTC operated the bus services. Other locally-owned companies were permitted to bring passengers from the outlying areas into town. The GTC, incidentally, would in later years be sold and renamed Sri Jaya, making it the first major Malay bus company.
In Malaya, Indian unionists also backed the MCP. Prominent among them was the communist R.G. Balan, the Tamil publicist of the MCP in the Kampar and Tapah areas during the Japanese Occupation. He was later to control 90 per cent of the estate workers in Kedah and the Kinta Rubber Factory Workers Union in Perak. The MCP also made attempts to get Malay support, but made no headway as most Malays rejected communism as atheistic and anti-Islam. Gruesome memories of how MPAJA guerrillas had taken over rural police stations in the immediate post-war period, abducting and executing Malays they randomly accused of being Japanese collaborators, were still fresh. The MCP also formed a peasant party, the
Yet most people in Malaya were very anti-communist. They remembered that after the Japanese surrender, the communists had tried to rule the country. This was also a time of political awakening in Singapore. With the island’s large Chinese majority, the communists seemed set to dominate Singapore politics for good. They quickly gained control of the trade unions and the Chinese schools. Indian trade unionists in Singapore also teamed up with the MCP-controlled unions, in particular the Harbour Workers Union. Had Singapore become communist, the insurrection in Malaya would have been stepped up.
Meanwhile, the guerrillas were getting more active and their well-planned ambushes resulted in many security personnel being killed. British and other Commonwealth troops, together with Malay soldiers, were among the casualties. The guerrillas were well organised—a sure sign that they were receiving support from sympathisers among the Chinese population. Called the Min Yuen, or People’s Movement, this support arm of the party was made up of Malayan Chinese who worked silently to provide food, medical supplies and money to the guerrillas.
The British authorities responded to the communist challenge by declaring a state of Emergency. Under this rule, ordinary operations of the law were largely suspended. Communist suspects, for example, could be detained without trial for as long as it pleased the Government, a move that would be the precursor to the Internal Security Act (ISA). [3] The situation served the British well for, as far as they were concerned, the longer the Emergency went on, the longer ordinary laws could be ignored. The power of the Government would be unlimited and would also be free from scrutiny by the courts. There was no right to challenge arrests and detentions in court during colonial days and even after Independence. It was only after I became Prime Minister that, in a case brought by lawyer and Opposition politician Karpal Singh, the age-old legal mechanism of habeas corpus [4] was invoked to obtain the release of ISA detainees.
The British, however, made their classic error of underestimating the strength of an opposing Asian force. The determination of the MCP should have been amply clear: there was an escalation in trade union activities and in the intimidation of the workers. In response, the British brought in trade unionists from the UK to advise the workers and their leaders, which was clearly an exercise in futility. When a dispute arose between the workers and the General Transport Company (GTC)—a British company which operated buses in Kuala Lumpur—the communist trade union activists simply sabotaged the vehicles, puncturing the tires and damaging the engines. But the strike was only in town where the GTC operated the bus services. Other locally-owned companies were permitted to bring passengers from the outlying areas into town. The GTC, incidentally, would in later years be sold and renamed Sri Jaya, making it the first major Malay bus company.
In Malaya, Indian unionists also backed the MCP. Prominent among them was the communist R.G. Balan, the Tamil publicist of the MCP in the Kampar and Tapah areas during the Japanese Occupation. He was later to control 90 per cent of the estate workers in Kedah and the Kinta Rubber Factory Workers Union in Perak. The MCP also made attempts to get Malay support, but made no headway as most Malays rejected communism as atheistic and anti-Islam. Gruesome memories of how MPAJA guerrillas had taken over rural police stations in the immediate post-war period, abducting and executing Malays they randomly accused of being Japanese collaborators, were still fresh. The MCP also formed a peasant party, the
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