over the viability of their rule in the Pashtun homeland would exacerbate tensions among Omar’s senior lieutenants over the Arab presence, and that this, in combination with certain positive inducements we could make, might just convince Mullah Omar to find a pretext to break with bin Laden and the rest of his problematic Arab guests.
As the Taliban, and particularly Mullah Jallil, had made clear to us,there were significant things they wanted: in particular, they craved international recognition as a legitimate government. They very much wanted to take over Afghanistan’s empty seat at the United Nations. Having pacified most of Afghanistan, some, at least, in the leadership—witness Jalil’s dalliance with Akbar—wanted to get out from under international sanctions to pursue business opportunities.
My thought was that if we could arrive at the right combination of pressures and inducements, we might create a situation where the Taliban shura , or leadership council, could persuade or compel Omar to break with bin Laden and force him and his al-Qa’ida followers to flee to locations where we and our allies could hunt them down more easily. That was the theory.
In the spring of 2001, shortly after the March presidential briefing at CIA Headquarters, I laid out my thinking for Ambassador Milam. We agreed that as I pursued the right to employ new sticks against the Taliban, he would take on the task of acquiring corresponding carrots. He paralleled the efforts I was making in CIA channels with an ultra-secret “Nodis”—for “No Dissemination”—cable of his own, alluding obliquely to what I was doing, and seeking support for rewards that could be offered to the Taliban in return for bin Laden’s expulsion.
The ambassador’s efforts were met with cold silence. No one in the State Department would say why in print, but we soon learned their reasoning through visiting officials. “Look,” one said to me, displaying the exquisite if sometimes craven feel for political self-preservation that had so frustrated me during my year in their building, “anything even suggesting leniency toward the Taliban is a political loser.” The Taliban had a rather serious PR problem in the United States, to say the least. Their vicious, bloody-minded repression of women, in particular, was winning them no friends in America. Mavis Leno, wife of the famous comic and talk-show host, was appearing on national television accompanied by women in burqas , the traditional head-to-toe covering imposed on women in Taliban-controlled areas, highlighting the injustices of clerical rule in Afghanistan. It was hard not to empathize with their cause, but we were putting ourselves in a situation with the Taliban where we could no longer take yes for an answer regardingbin Laden. In the meantime, televising burqas in the United States was not having much effect in Afghan villages.
As I laid all this out for the director in his office, he peppered me with questions and took notes. Much had changed since March at the Washington end, as well. Where new covert action against the Taliban had not even been on the agenda in the early spring, it was very much on the agenda now. A growing pattern of intelligence from around the world, both human and technical, had convinced Tenet and the CIA leadership that a major attack by al-Qa’ida was not only certain but imminent. In a series of meetings with Condoleezza Rice, Tenet and Cofer Black had convinced the administration that the United States should go on the attack. But there was no consensus as to how that should be done.
Deputy Director McLaughlin noted that there would be a Deputies’ Committee meeting at the White House in a few days’ time to discuss the issue. The Deputies’ Committee was the second-highest body in the national security system; their job was to vet ideas and make proposals for consideration by the cabinet-level Principals’ Committee. “Take Bob with you,” George
As the Taliban, and particularly Mullah Jallil, had made clear to us,there were significant things they wanted: in particular, they craved international recognition as a legitimate government. They very much wanted to take over Afghanistan’s empty seat at the United Nations. Having pacified most of Afghanistan, some, at least, in the leadership—witness Jalil’s dalliance with Akbar—wanted to get out from under international sanctions to pursue business opportunities.
My thought was that if we could arrive at the right combination of pressures and inducements, we might create a situation where the Taliban shura , or leadership council, could persuade or compel Omar to break with bin Laden and force him and his al-Qa’ida followers to flee to locations where we and our allies could hunt them down more easily. That was the theory.
In the spring of 2001, shortly after the March presidential briefing at CIA Headquarters, I laid out my thinking for Ambassador Milam. We agreed that as I pursued the right to employ new sticks against the Taliban, he would take on the task of acquiring corresponding carrots. He paralleled the efforts I was making in CIA channels with an ultra-secret “Nodis”—for “No Dissemination”—cable of his own, alluding obliquely to what I was doing, and seeking support for rewards that could be offered to the Taliban in return for bin Laden’s expulsion.
The ambassador’s efforts were met with cold silence. No one in the State Department would say why in print, but we soon learned their reasoning through visiting officials. “Look,” one said to me, displaying the exquisite if sometimes craven feel for political self-preservation that had so frustrated me during my year in their building, “anything even suggesting leniency toward the Taliban is a political loser.” The Taliban had a rather serious PR problem in the United States, to say the least. Their vicious, bloody-minded repression of women, in particular, was winning them no friends in America. Mavis Leno, wife of the famous comic and talk-show host, was appearing on national television accompanied by women in burqas , the traditional head-to-toe covering imposed on women in Taliban-controlled areas, highlighting the injustices of clerical rule in Afghanistan. It was hard not to empathize with their cause, but we were putting ourselves in a situation with the Taliban where we could no longer take yes for an answer regardingbin Laden. In the meantime, televising burqas in the United States was not having much effect in Afghan villages.
As I laid all this out for the director in his office, he peppered me with questions and took notes. Much had changed since March at the Washington end, as well. Where new covert action against the Taliban had not even been on the agenda in the early spring, it was very much on the agenda now. A growing pattern of intelligence from around the world, both human and technical, had convinced Tenet and the CIA leadership that a major attack by al-Qa’ida was not only certain but imminent. In a series of meetings with Condoleezza Rice, Tenet and Cofer Black had convinced the administration that the United States should go on the attack. But there was no consensus as to how that should be done.
Deputy Director McLaughlin noted that there would be a Deputies’ Committee meeting at the White House in a few days’ time to discuss the issue. The Deputies’ Committee was the second-highest body in the national security system; their job was to vet ideas and make proposals for consideration by the cabinet-level Principals’ Committee. “Take Bob with you,” George
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